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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
ALFRED ROGER l\IOORE, 
Respondent, 
vs. 
THE DEKVER & RIO GRANDE 
\YESTER~ RAILROAD C 0 M - I 
P AXY, a corporation, • 
Appellant. J 
Case No. 
8284 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Plaintiff's statement of fact is in large part inexact 
and misleading. Rather than point out the inaccuracy of 
numerous statements of counsel and the misleading effect 
of quotations isolated from context found throughout the 
Brief of Respondent, we solicit the close attention of the 
court to the medical and lay testimony contained in the 
record which we feel when read in context will fully sup-
port appellant's argument. 
We are convinced, however, that a reply is warranted 
and would be helpful to the court in view of plaintiff's 
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argument of the points involved and particularly counsel's 
skillful citation of authorities which have no bearing here, 
but which are made to appear to be in point. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDI-
CIAL ERROR IN FAILING TO GIVE APPEL-
LANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 16. 
(a) The evidence is insufficient to show the ex-
istence of a disc injury. 
(b) The evidence is not sufficient to show a 
causal connection between the accident and 
the alleged disc injury. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJU-
DICIAL ERROR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION 
NO. 12. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING IN-
STRUCTION NO. 13. 
POINT IV. 
T·HE JURY'S VERDICT WAS SO EXCESSIVE 
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS 
CASE AS TO INDICATE THAT· THE JURY 
WAS INFLUENCED BY PASSION AND PREJ-
UDICE. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDI-
CIAL ERROR IN FAILING TO GIVE APPEL-
LANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 16. 
(a) The evidence is insufficient to show the ex-
istence of a disc injury. 
By its Point No. 1 defendant contends that the evidence 
is not sufficient to show that a disc injury was. caused by 
the incident of August 9, 1951. We argued that plaintiff's 
evidence was not sufficient unless it demonstrated to a 
"reasonable certainty" the nature and cause of the alleged 
injury. 
Counsel for plaintiff urge that the "reasonable cer-
tainty" rule (which appears to be common to other juris-
dictions) has been expressly repudiated in Utah. To sup-
port their contention the cases of Picino v. Utah-Apex 
Mining Co., 52 Utah 338, 173 Pac. 900 and Kirchgestner v. 
The Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Company, 118 
Utah 20, 218 P. 2d 685 are cited. Those cases dealt with 
proof of "future pain and suffering." Proof of the nature 
and cause of an alleged existing injury understandably pre-
sents a different problem. The Arizona Court recognized 
the distinction in Coppinger v. Broderick, 37 Ariz. 473, 295 
Pac. 780, where it was said: 
"* * * The apprehended future consequences 
of an injury * * * from their very nature 
* * * must be measured by a rule more or less 
flexible." 
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The degree of proof required to show alleged existing dam-
ages was properly stated in Telluride Power Co. v. Williams, 
172 F'. 2d 673, (lOth Cir. 1949). On appeal from the district 
court of Utah the court of appeals said: 
"Damages are not recoverable unless they are 
clearly ascertainable both in their nature and origin, 
and unless it is also so established that they are the 
natural and proximate consequence of the breach 
and are not contingent or speculative." 
See also United States v. Griffith, Gornall and Carman, Inc., 
210 F. 2d 11, (lOth Cir. 1954), (damages must be shown 
to a "reasonable certainty"). 
Even assuming the rule in the Picino and Kirchgestner 
cases relating to proof of future damages to be applicable 
here, plaintiff's proof falls short of that required. Those 
cases ruled that damages for future pain and suffering that 
plaintiff "will probably endure" may be recovered. In ex-
plaining its position the court said in the Picino case: 
"We think there is a clear distinction between 
that which 'may happen' and that which 'will prob-
ably happen.' The former may imply a mere possi-
bility, while the latter implies that which is likely 
to happen." 
The differentiation between "probable" and "possible" in 
the Picino case clearly indicates the insufficiency of plain-
tiff's evidence which does not go beyond proof of a mere 
''possibility." 
Counsel for plaintiff next cite Jackson v. Harries, 65 
Utah 282, 236 Pac. 234, urging that the speculative testi-
mony of Doctor Clegg was admissible in evidence. As to 
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this appeal the question of admissibility is moot. We have 
argued that even assuming the admissibility of the ques-
tioned portions of Doctor Clegg's testimony the evidence 
is not sufficient to justify a finding of a disc injury. 
The Jackson case dealt with the admissibility of medi-
cal evidence relating to causal connection. Unlike the in-
stant case the condition from which plaintiff was suffer-
ing had been clearly established. The decision, holding that 
the trial court had not erred in allowing testimony that 
the condition "could have" been caused by defendant's 
vvTrongful act, said: 
"* * * when considering it in connection 
with n.ll the other evidence in the case bearing upon 
the point [the jury might] conclude that the as-
sumed cause was the real cause of the injury." 
In the case at bar there is absolutely no evidence in the 
record to corroborate the doctor's conjecture that plaintiff 
was possibly suffering from a ruptured disc or that the 
accident of August 9, 1951, could have caused such an in-
jury. As pointed out in appellant's brief proof of the ex-
istence of a disc injury must come from the testimony of 
skilled and professional men and the only expert who testi-
fied for plaintiff was Doctor Clegg. 
Neither does Sharp v. Esso Standard Oil Co., (La. 
App.), 72 So. 2d 601, support plaintiff's position. In that 
case the court was not confronted with a question of proof 
of the nature or existence of an injury. The question before 
the court was that of causal connection. As pointed out 
in appellant's brief medical evidence as to causal connection 
where there is a known injury may be corroborated by lay 
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testimony, and in the Esso case the court did not rely upon 
the medical testimony alone but leaned heavily upon the 
testimony of a number of other witnesses. Quoting from 
2 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, p. 322 the court 
said: 
"* * * a doctor's use of such words as 
'might'') 'could', 'likely', 'possible' and 'may have', 
coupled with other credible evidence * * * is 
sufficient to sustain an award." 
Even under what appears at first hand to be a broad hold-
ing of a Louisiana Appellate Court a doctor's speculative 
testimony is not sufficient without "other credible evi-
dence." Plaintiff does not urge that there is any credible 
evidence whatsoever in the case at bar which would corrob-
orate Doctor Clegg's testimony. 
The Esso case is the only case relied upon by plaintiff 
to show the sufficiency of the evidence. Counsel have not 
challenged the general rule of law stated in 135 A. L. R. 
516 and no attempt is made to distinguish the controlling 
law in Utah which is set forth in Chief Consolidated Mining 
Co. v. Salisbury, 61 Utah 66, 210 Pac. 929. 
Contrary to plaintiff's suggestion we do not concede 
the admissibility of the doctor's testimony as to the exis-
tence of a disc injury. Where the fact to be proved is of a 
nature which must necessarily be shown exclusively by 
medical testimony, evidence tending only to show possibili-
ties should not be received. Notwithstanding this, we have 
chosen on this appeal to present the more fundamental 
question of sufficiency of the evidence. 
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Counsel have urged that the court should not undertake 
to distinguish between the language "possible" and "prob-
able." They assert that the doctor selected the word "possi-
ble" simply because he was not certain about his diagnosis. 
The impotence of this argument is apparent when the medi-
cal testimony is consulted. The doctor himself answered 
that he could not say that there was "probably" but only 
that there was "possibly" an injured disc (R. 65). Cer-
tainly if the medical expert distinguishes between the choice 
of words the court should not be precluded from doing so. 
We see no reason why the court should depart from its dif-
ferentiation between that which is "likely" and that which 
is merely "possible." 
Plaintiff states at page 27 of his brief that "no other 
cause for this nerve irritation was suggested." We are 
unable to determine from this statement whether counsel 
is suggesting that defendant had the burden of proving the 
non-existence of a disc injury or that the existence of nerve 
irritation conclusively shows a disc injury. If counsel are 
suggesting the first alternative, they are clearly in error 
because to require defendant to prove the non-existence of 
an alleged injury would be to shift the burden of proof 
from plaintiff to defendant. If counsel are suggesting the 
second alternative, they can find no comfort in the record 
for the proposition that irritation of the sciatic nerve indi-
cates a disc injury. Their own medical witness, who was 
employed for the purpose of testifying at the trial in pref-
erence to nine ( 9) doctors who had examined plaintiff for 
actual treatments, testified that this symptom coupled with 
others indicated only a possible disc injury. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
Counsel also urge at page 27 of respondent's brief that 
it is immaterial what specific condition was causing the 
sciatica (irritation of the sciatic nerve). This position may 
have had some merit if counsel for plaintiff had not sought 
to show that the nerve irritation was caused by a serious 
spinal injury which would result in permanent disability. 
Had plaintiff stopped with proof of the nerve irritation and 
not insisted upon injecting into the case the speculation of 
a spinal injury ; and had counsel not demanded that this 
speculation be submitted to the jury it would have been a 
different matter. As it is, the ruptured disc testimony 
and the evidence of permanent disability which was based 
upon the supposition of a disc injury was submitted to the 
jury for their speculation and this cannot be considered by 
an appellate court as harmless or immaterial. 
(b) The evidence is not sufficient to show a 
causal connection between the accident and 
the alleged disc injury. 
A careful reading of respondent's brief reveals that 
respondent does not challenge the proposition urged by 
appellant that the evidence is insufficient to show a causal 
connection between the accident and the alleged disc injury. 
We do not question the authorities cited by counsel. 
As a matter of fact we have not urged on this appeal that 
the evidence was insufficient to show that plaintiff may 
have sustained some damage as a result of the accident. 
Still, there was absolutely no evidence that the accident 
caused a disc injury. While we do not contend that plain-
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tiff's evidence failed to show any damage, we do submit 
that the jury should not have been allowed to speculate on 
the spinal injury. 
Certainly it cannot be questioned that the amount of 
the verdict might well have been different had the jury 
been instructed that there was not sufficient evidence upon 
which to conclude that Moore was suffering from a disc 
injury. (Respondent has not questioned this.) The jury 
likely placed great weight on the doctor's illustration and 
explanation of the injury and his speculation that Moore 
was possibly suffering from the same. The jurors would 
likely have totally rejected plaintiff's claim of permanent 
disability had they been properly instructed because the 
doctor said that the diagnosis of permanent disability was 
based on the supposition of a disc injury (R. 82. See also 
R. 67). 
We submit that the failure to grant defendant's re-
quested Instruction No. 16 was prejudicial error. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJU-
DICIAL ERROR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION 
NO. 12. 
Counsel for plaintiff have made no contention in their 
brief that Instruction No. 12 given by the trial court is 
material to any issue in this case. Authority is cited, how-
ever, for the proposition that this instruction properly 
stated the substantive law. It is elementary that an in-
struction is not justifiably given simply because it properly 
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states a rule of law. The Supreme Court of Utah deciding 
this precise question said in Parker v. Bamberger, 100 Utah 
361, 116 P. 2d 425, 430: 
"* * * it is error for the trial court to give 
an instruction, though such an instruction correctly 
states the law, on a matter extraneous the issues 
and evidence of the case." 
This statement of the law finds support in the decisions of 
numerous other courts. See 88 C. J. S. 967-69 . 
• Plaintiff reasons that State Workmen's Compensation 
Laws are not a form of insurance because there is a "great 
bulk of litigation in connection with the right of injured 
employees to recover under the Workmen's Compensation 
Laws * * *" and that therefore the authorities relating 
to evidence of insurance and non-insurance are not in point. 
This argument is so untenable that it defeats itself. Al-
though we have not endeavored to count the pages of the 
Decennial Digest dealing with insurance law we suggest 
that there is also a great bulk of litigation arising out of 
insurance contracts. Our statutes provide that employers 
must secure compensation to their employees (a) by "in-
suring" with the State Insurance Fund, or (b) by "insur-
ing" with certain private insurance organizations or (c) 
by self-insurance of the employer (35-1-46 U. C. A., 1953). 
Liability does not depend upon fault but follows from a 
showing of injury or death arising out of or in the course 
of employment. This being so, workmen's compensation 
payments are in the same category as proceeds of insur-
ance contracts. 
At page 41 of respondent's brief counsel have at-
tempted to set forth the legal objections to evidence of 
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insurance coverage. Reference is· made in the argument 
to cases dealing with evidence of insurance or non-insur-
ance of the defendant and counsel assert that the same 
reasons for rejecting the evidence in those situations do 
not apply in the instant case. The case at bar does not 
involve either situation discussed in respondent's brief for 
this is a case where counsel sought to and succeeded in 
informing the jury of non-insurance of the plaintiff. The 
case of Lee v. O-smundson, 203 Minn. 487, 289 N. W. 63, 
cited by appellant rules that such evidence "can serve but 
one purpose" and that to allow the admission of the same 
is prejudicial error. 
Plaintiff's request for this instruction and the giving 
of the same had the effect of an appeal to the passions of 
the jury. Whether evidence relating to insurance is calcu-
lated to incite prejudice against the defendant (as in the 
situation discussed by counsel for plaintiff) or sympathy 
in favor of the plaintiff (as in the case at bar) its admis-
sion is prejudicial. Had this information come to the jury 
as a casual or inadvertent allusion to non-insurance (lack 
of workmen's compensation) the situation would be dif-
ferent. Here, however, the information came to the jury 
in the form of written instructions from the trial judge at 
the instance and request of counsel for plaintiff. 
In justification for the instruction it is contended that 
it was necessary to dispel in the minds of the jury the 
possible false impressions that plaintiff had pursued the 
wrong remedy or that he had an additional remedy. The 
jury, of course, was instructed that plaintiff was entitled 
to recover if defendant was guilty of actionable negligence 
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and in the face of such instructions it seems inconceivable 
that the jury would surmise that plaintiff had pursued 
the wrong remedy in bringing his action under the F. E. 
L. A. Counsel's apprehension that the jury might believe 
plaintiff to have an additional remedy under the compen-
sation act is certainly not a justifiable reason for giving 
the instruction. Evidence that a plaintiff or defendant 
may have a remedy against an insurance company on an 
insurance contract is wholly immaterial and irrelevant to 
the issues of the case and is held prejudicial to the adverse 
party when received in evidence. 
Counsel rely on Bruner v. McCarthy, 105 Utah 399, 
142 P. 2d 649 to support their argument that Instruction 
No. 12 was not prejudicial. A careful reading of that de-
cision will reveal that the facts involved there bear no simi-
larity whatsoever to the case at bar and the holding does 
not in any particular support the proposition for which 
the case is cited. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING IN-
STRUCTION NO. 13. 
Plaintiff singles out two lines of testimony from his 
cross-examination and asserts that the two questions pro-
pounded constituted "* * * an attempt to revive the 
doctrine of assumption of risk under a new guise * * *" 
This is an unfounded afterthought on the part of counsel for 
plaintiff. No assertion was made at trial that the testimony 
sought to be elicited was not material to the issues of the 
case. There is no indication in the evidence or pleadings 
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that assumption of risk was relied on as a possible defense 
to the action. 
The court's Instruction No. 22 referred to by plaintiff 
was directed only to the issue of contributory negligence. 
Since nothing was said by court, counsel, or the wit-
nesses from which the jury might infer that plaintiff by 
law must be considered to have assumed the risks created 
by his employer's negligence Instruction No. 12 was wholly 
foreign to the issues of the case. 
In the Bruner case referred to by plaintiff this court 
held that such an instruction was improper but not prej u-
dicial. In that case, however, defendant was found to be 
negligent as a matter of law. 
We think that under the facts of this case the decision 
of the Nebraska Supreme Court in Ellis v. Union Pacific 
R. Co., 148 Neb. 515, 27 N. W. 2d 921, is controlling. In 
that case, where a similar instruction on assumption of 
risk was given, the Court said: 
"Assumption of risk is an affirmative defense. 
In the case at bar it was not made an issue either 
by the pleadings or the evidence. Therefore it had 
no relation to the issues in the case and should not 
have been given." 
Under the facts of the Ellis case the improper instruction 
was held prejudicial error. 
POINT IV. 
THE JURY'S VERDICT WAS SO EXCESSIVE 
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS 
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CASE AS TO INDICATE THAT· THE JURY 
WAS INFLUENCED BY PASSION AND PREJ-
UDICE. 
Counsel for plaintiff preface their argument under 
this section with the statement: 
"The sole claim [of appellant] is that the 
amount of the verdict in view of the evidence of in-
jury and damage established that the jury was in-
fluenced by passion and prejudice." 
This, of course, is not true because the entire argument 
of appellant under Point II is directed to the proposition 
that the giving of Instruction No. 12 was calculated to and 
had the effect of arousing the sympathy and passion of the 
jury in favor of plaintiff and against defendant. The ex-
cessive verdict could very likely be the result of instruc-
tion No. 12. 
Again it would be unduly burdensome to the reader 
(and perhaps improper in a reply brief) to point out all 
of the statements of counsel relating to Moore's injuries 
which we feel are unjustified by the record. We cite a 
single exan1ple as typical of counsel's infractions in this 
regard. Plaintiff asserts at pages 54-55 of his brief that 
the following statement made in appellant's brief is not 
supported by the evidence. 
" 'In May of 1953, Moore went to work for the 
Cater Construction Co. and worked ten and one-half 
hours per day at least five days per week doing ex-
tremely heavy manual labor (hauling and setting 
poles) and yet never complained about his back (Ex. 
9, R. 317).'" 
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Commenting on this respondent says : 
"The foregoing statement is contrary to the 
evidence most favorable to Moore which is, that he 
was unable to work steady because of his back con-
dition, and that during an ordinary work week he 
would work two or three days and lay off a few 
days (R. 149, 150) ." 
With regard to this matter the record shows the fol-
lowing: 
On direct examination Moore testified as follows: 
R. 48 
"Q. When did you next work? 
"A. I wor~ed for Cater Construction Company. 
* * * * 
"Q. What was the occasion of your ceasing to 
work for that company? 
"A. He let me go on account of I could not be 
steady." 
On cross-examination he testified : 
R. 127, 128 
"Q. Did you work steady from the time you 
started with the Cater Construction Company until 
you quit? 
"A. No. 
"Q. In July, well, how many days would you 
average a week? 
"A. Well I don't know what the average would 
be.'' 
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R. 130 
"Q. Now, Mr. Moore, I have here what pur-
ports to be time slips of the Cater Electrical Con-
struction Company, Incorporated, appearing to bear 
your signature, and I refer you to second line of a 
slip dated May 9, bearing the name of 'A. R. Moore', 
is that your signature?" 
These time slips were identified, offered and received in 
evidence as Exhibit 9 (R. 135) and will show the exact 
hours worked by Moore. The cross examination then pro-
ceeded: 
"Q. Most of those occasions when you worked 
through from Monday until Friday and Saturday, 
you worked ten hours, and more, a day, did you not? 
"A. Yes." 
R. 137 
"Q. Well, you still want to testify that you 
didn't work steady during the months of May and 
June, 1953, for Cater Construction Company?" 
(Objection-discussion.) 
"Q. Well, all right can you answer the ques-
tion? 
"A. 'Steady' is every day of the week. 
"Q. In other words what you consider steady 
work is Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, 
Friday, Saturday and Sunday? 
"A. On that job." ' 
R. 137 
"Q. * * * Did you at any time tell the 
Cater Construction people that you were having dif-
ficulty with your back because of an injury you had 
sustained while working for the railroad? 
"A. I don't believe I did." 
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In the face of this testimony counsel for respondent urge 
that the evidence shows that Moore during an ordinary 
work week would work two or three days and lay off a 
few days. To support this statement they cite pages 149 
and 150 of the record. The only evidence on those pages 
relating to the number of days per week worked by Moore 
en the Cater Construction Co. job was the following: 
"Q. Would it be true, then, Mr. Moore, that, 
in September of 1953, rather than working just two 
or three days a week, you worked 123 hours at $1.50 
an hour, and 341;2 hours at $1.75 an hour? 
"A. I don't know whether that is correct or 
not. 
"Q. Would you say it isn't? 
"A. I wouldn't say it wasn't correct." 
This testimony hardly supports plaintiff's direct contradic-
tion of defendant's statement of the evidence relating to 
the Cater Construction Company job. Other statements 
rr1ade by plaintiff in the account of the evidence seem to us 
equally misleading and erroneous. 
That Moore was suffering from a serious disabling 
injury is conclusively rebutted by evidence of his physical 
activities to the effect that within a short time after the 
accident he cut and put up his own hay; went elk hunting 
on a pack trip two times; rode horses in the care of his 
sheep; boxed; danced; enaged in a calf-roping and bull-
dogging contest and pursued such employment as truck 
driving, hauling and setting poles, and rolling and chopping 
logs. 
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We are confident that a solicitous reading of the testi-
mony in this case will reveal that the amount of damages 
awarded is grossly disproportionate to Moore's loss. 
CONCLUSION 
The jury was allowed to consider in assessing damages 
the medical speculation of plaintiff's witness; they were 
instructed in effect that unless their verdict compensated 
plaintiff for his alleged injuries he would have no remun-
eration ; the court instructed on an issue foreign to the 
case tending to convey to the minds of the jurors that the 
law favors an injured worker over his employer, and the 
result was an excessive verdict. These errors and each of 
them constituted a clear denial of justice. 
We believe that under these circumstances the defen-
dant should have a fair opportunity to go to the jury in 
this case. The law affords that right to litigants under our 
system of jurisprudence and we submit that application 
cf the law in this case requires a reversal of the judgment 
below. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, 
CORNWALL & McCARTHY, 
CLIFFORD L. ASHTON, 
GRANT MACFARLANE JR., 
Counsel for Appellant. 
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